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Abstract 
The feminization of labor markets through the role of education is among the means 
that enhances the participation of women to development and ensures further 
involvement of human resources in the growth and development processes. While this 
is a process that is highly pursued in most developed economies, it is not clearly seen to 
be pervasive in most developing countries. The Arab economies are among those 
countries where lower participation of women is observed but where education is an 
important driver for further feminization of labor markets. These issues are discussed in 
the present chapter to underline the role of education in Arab economies in expanding 
further participation of human resources to local labor markets in these economies.  
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Introduction 
The feminization of labor markets through the role of education is among the 
means that enhances the participation of women to development and ensures further 
involvement of human resources in the growth and development processes. While this 
is a process that is highly pursued in most developed economies, it is not clearly seen 
to be pervasive in most developing countries. The Arab economies are among those 
countries where lower participation of women is observed but where education can be 
an important driver for further female participation and feminization of labor markets.  
One of the main determinants for obtaining a specific job nowadays is one’s 
educational level. Therefore to study the workforce characteristics, one needs to start 
by taking a look at education. For a long time, accessing school has been an issue in 
the Arab world. This is even harder for girls where opportunities for staying in school 
are often constrained by series of household, social and individual constraints. Girls 
have particularly suffered from this issue and efforts have been made to overcome it 
  
 2
(Sika, 2011). This higher emphasis on females’ participation in education at all levels 
has led to a new phenomenon of feminization of the labor markets, mainly in places 
and locations that are not commonly having women.  
Feminization is the new term for the growing contribution of females in the job 
market in the past decades. Standing (1999) was the first one to look into this 
phenomenon in the late twentieth century in global economy. The author detected that 
“the pattern of employment tends to result in an increasing proportion of women 
occupying the jobs” (p. 583). However, the Arab world was not studied separately in 
this research and may present different conclusions than Standing’s. This paper aims 
to first develop a theoretical model that would link feminization of the job market 
from the first stages of education. Second, it will identify the trends of females’ 
education in the past years to support the underlying assumptions the model will be 
based on. Next, it will tackle the empirical methods used to match statistics in the 
Arab world to the theory discussed. Finally, the empirical analysis will test the 
hypothesis that explains how feminization of labor in the Arab world is achieved. 
      
I. Literature review  
It took several years of governments’ initiatives and efforts to insert girls in 
the modern schooling system of Arab countries. This is well expressed when 
analyzing Barro and Lee databases (2010) where the average years of schooling of 
females has been increasing over the 1950-2010 period.  This trend has been 
concerning primary, secondary and tertiary education of females. These data show 
also a decreasing gender gap but this is still present even under these major changes. 
The tables of chapter 2 of the present book, indicating time trends for total and for 
females illustrate clearly the increasing pattern of schooling progress among females 
in Arab countries. But, the speed of change appears to be lower than the one 
prevailing in Eastern and Central European Economies. More efforts are consequently 
needed from Arab countries with series of initiatives developed to include more 
women in education.  
The article “The Millennium Development Goals: Prospects for Gender 
Equality in the Arab World” by Nadine Sika (2011) provides evidence for the lower 
access to schooling faced by Arab girls. It states numbers for illiteracy rates of 
females and males in the Arab World with the tendency of higher illiteracy rate for 
females. The article discusses the emergence of girls’ schools with their assumed role 
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in education. Another interesting point that this article raises is that accessing schools 
is harder for girls due to implicit legal and social practices. Moreover, the author 
provides support to the premise of women’s increasing relatively higher performance 
in the educational system. However, these high potential shown by females in school, 
do not appear to be translated significantly in more positions in the job market. These 
trends are clearly indicated by the existing data on unemployment by gender 
throughout the Arab economies as reported by International Labor Organization (ILO, 
2009) and Word bank databases.  
 
Even with higher school enrollment rates, Arab countries still need to tackle 
the dropout problem. The Dubai school inspection bureau annual report (2010) 
presents statistics for enrollment and dropout rates in Dubai for the past years. Then it 
moves to a case-by-case analysis for private, public, and language school. It assesses 
the performance of the country’s school system and the evolution of its education. 
This report comes after two rounds of school inspections the bureau went through. 
Therefore, it shades the light on the changes that they have undergone. Finally, it 
comes up with a set of recommendations for these schools based on their performance 
in the past year. 
This gender discrepancy is not the same throughout all the Arab states. 
Afiouni and Karam  (2013) explain how Arab countries do not share the same level of 
macro factors. Such factors include GDP growth, Human Development Index (HDI), 
fertility and annual population growth. However, levels of gender gap in the Arab 
countries seem to be some of the highest in the world. This gap is more noticeable in 
political and economic participations and a little less in education. The reasons behind 
this discrepancy differ but a common factor is the discrimination in laws or their 
enforcement. Next, the authors discuss other socioeconomic factors leading to this 
gender gap throughout the region. They then provide a study on how human resources 
(HR) policies affect women’s participation in universities. The authors concluded that 
encouraging women’s involvement in higher education in the Arab region should start 
by revisiting HR policies. 
Several Arab countries have already started working on policy-making in 
order to improve women’s conditions in education. As an example, Chedati (2004) 
explains Morocco’s strategy of reducing discrepancies between boys and girls at 
schools. In an article, he provides statistics of dropouts in different school levels by 
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gender through a series of years. He also shows how the ratio of girls accessing 
schooling has gone up in Morocco with a decrease in dropout rate. This implies less 
gender gap in Moroccan schools with the ministry taking measures to hopefully get 
rid of it. Last, the report compares the evolution of dropout rates in different regions 
of Morocco for successive school years with respect to the corresponding government 
expenditure. Even though this report was written eight years ago, most of these 
changes are still ongoing. Yamouri (2010), reports that the gender parity index has 
been improving and that programs are being developed to control for dropout rates 
and work on their diminution.        
When provided with the same education, females do not show signs of 
inferiority with respect to males. An experiment conducted by Devine, Fawcett, 
Scucs, and Dowkers (2012) showed that there were no difference in math 
performance between girls and boys even though girls showed higher mathematic 
anxiety and test anxiety. Even more surprising, the authors state that gender 
performance is decreasing to non-existent in gender-equal countries (Devine et al., 
2012). Therefore, when provided with equal learning opportunities, girls seem to 
perform as well as boys. 
Performing more internationalized tests have also shown the same results. 
Meshawi (2012) discusses the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS), a test performed on fourth grade (9 to 10 years) and eighth grade (14-15 
years) children, in Egypt (2012). Results from this test in Egypt have shown that girls 
outperformed boys in 2007 while there was no significance of such difference in 
achievement in 2003. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in achievement 
whether the teacher is a male or a female (although there were 80% male math 
teachers). This reinforces the intuition that men and women are as skilled in 
mathematics. According to the results of this study, students in single-sex schools, on 
average, perform better in math and science than those in mixed schools (Meshawi, 
2012). When looked at it for boys and girls separately, girls in single-sex school have 
better score than those in mixed schools. However, no significant difference is found 
for males in single-sex and mixed schools.   
 When differences are found between boys and girls performances, there is 
usually an inequality in some determining factors. Driouchi and Reiffers (2012) 
explain the gender gap in performance in math and sciences in North African 
countries with social factors such as family, political, and educational ones. Inequality 
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of opportunities is a major issue for students in the region making education for girls 
tougher. Nevertheless, according to the TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study), girls can do at least as well as boys in science and math in most 
countries. In some cases, girls even outperform boys in these fields. Hence, gender is 
not a determinant in students’ performance in science. The problem of gender 
inequality in Arab countries is explained by poor educational system rather than 
gender gap in skills. 
The increase in female school enrollment rates has also appeared in tertiary 
education. Jaramillo et al (2012) discuss higher education in the Arab region. The 
authors show the growing tertiary schooling of Arab students either locally or 
internationally. They first show the progress of local institutions in the private and 
public sector after Arab countries have realized the importance of quality education to 
obtain skilled workers. Then, they discuss the importance of internationalization of 
higher education and how Arab economies benefit from it. Arab countries send more 
students abroad than they receive international students in Arab institutions. The 
authors develop this further by stating percentages of students going abroad by 
country and major. Finally, they compare the yearly progression of international 
students from Arab countries.  
 Nonetheless, the domestic enrollment rates in higher education do not include 
students who go abroad. But, the percentage of female who travels to study in foreign 
institutions is still low compared to that percentage of male. During the conference on 
“Policy Making Opportunities in Business, Finance, and Human Resource 
Development in DC”, Alkhalaf (2012) addresses issues about the Saudi students in 
the US and shows that 78% of those students who go abroad have a scholarship. The 
author provides information on how these scholarships are allocated and distributed 
among men and women. He shows that 24% of Saudi scholars around the world are 
female. In the USA, only 22% of total Saudi students are female implying that 78 % 
of the Saudi students in the USA, are male.   
Graduating from a higher institution does not guarantee that Arab women 
participate in the job market or start their careers. Solovieva (2013) provides an 
insight on the struggles Arab women face after college in order to find a job. The 
author presents a testimonial of a young Egyptian graduate in her quest for work. The 
article also discusses how fewer opportunities are available for women in Egypt 
despite what politicians affirm. Statistics exhibit the low percentage of women in 
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executive positions in Egypt. The author examines the case of other Arab countries 
such as Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. In these Arab countries, women face barriers 
when trying to access the job market. Thus, the author presents different Arab 
governments’ standpoints on women’s unemployment and how each one deals with 
the issue. 
These difficulties women face are not exclusive to young graduates. 
Mcloughlin (2013) presents all the constraints that females face in the job market. 
These difficulties can be legal, social, cultural and even economical. She outlines the 
sectors where women are mostly present and their economic role in Arab countries. 
Moreover, she identifies gender gap in participation, remuneration, and advancement 
providing evidence for each one. Finally, she discusses these issues across countries 
suggesting a set of policy recommendations to overcome them. 
 Women need to find a way to make their voices heard in their countries. The 
portrait of progress report, by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(2012), tackles the issue of women empowerment in the United Arab Emirates. It 
provides statistics on the rate of working women in the Emirates in both public and 
private sectors. Because participation in the workforce is tightly related to education, 
the article also reports statistics of women’s participation in schools. Next, women in 
the workplace come with rights and organization. Therefore, the article shows how 
this is accomplished in the UAE through a set of examples. 
 What happens in the UAE is not a single occurrence. Many other Arab 
countries face women lack of empowerment in the job market. The Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation and Booz & Company (2012) compare unemployment rates 
between men and women in the Arab World. It provides rates by nationality, age 
range, and education level. They discuss the role of large employers in creating job 
opportunities for both genders and how this affects the feminization of the labor 
market. Finally, they assess the role of education in the readiness of an individual to 
the job. They state the pros and cons of local tertiary education versus international 
degrees for men and women. 
 Arab women have different positions in the job market depending on the 
country they live in. Comparing between several Arab countries is interesting if one 
wants to further understand gender gap in the work life. In a report, the World Bank 
Middle East and North Africa Social and Economic Development Group (2010) 
describe the status of women across different countries of the Arab region. It shows 
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their participation in the workforce through the years sorted by income group. It also 
tackles the issue of women in education across different levels (primary, secondary, 
and tertiary). Taking it even further, it compares performance between genders. The 
authors also identify higher education graduates by field of studies. Statistics of 
women in parliament are also provided to show their participation in political life. 
 These official unemployment rates are missing a market that is prevalent in 
the Arab region: informal labor. Angel Urdinola and Tanabe (2012) identify the 
determinants of informal employment in the Arab region. They study the relationship 
between informality and genders as well as informality and education level. They 
associate informality with highly agricultural countries and detect patterns of 
informality through age. Lastly, they provide statistics and charts to illustrate how the 
informal sector varies from a country to another. 
 As for the relationship between education and women labor participation, it is 
unclear whether there is a linear or a U-shape type of association. Klasen and Pieters 
(2012) claim that female labor participation with respect to education level should be 
U shaped. The reason behind such a statement is that females with little or no 
education would work in some manual positions because of their need for money. 
Females with very advanced degrees can enforce their positions in society and work, 
despite the challenges they typically face, because of the high salaries associated with 
their status. Women in between these two groups would be the ones suffering from all 
the barriers females typically face and thus have lower participation rates that the 
other groups. The authors assert that this U shape is also present between female labor 
participation and economic status. The have succeeded in showing these trends in the 
past twenty years in India.       
 Because of the constraints women have to deal with in the workforce, several 
Arab countries developing new strategies to evolve. A team of researchers at the 
World Bank (2012) explains the changes that the Arab region is undergoing in several 
fields. The Arab spring has raised concerns about the gender gap and countries are 
now listening to the people’s wish. The report is discussing how women are 
integrating the job market gradually. More females go to schools but the claim of the 
article is that there is a paradox that they refer to as the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) paradox. The paradox is defined as the unbalance between the number of 
females graduating and the one joining the workforce. It shades the lights on 
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inequalities between genders and how to overcome them through new reforms and 
actions. 
 These governments’ efforts were not wasted and a progress is happening. 
Yamouri (2010) states the progress of countries in the Arab region in term of 
shrinking the gender gap in education and workforce. She stipulates the many 
constraints Arab females face in the business world, either the cultural or the legal 
ones, and how their condition has been improving in the past years. She also discusses 
the cases of Morocco, Jordan, West Bank and Gaza, and Egyptian women 
independently. 
Looking at the high female unemployment rates in the Arab region, several 
authors have developed theories for the reasons why these rates do not match males’ 
(See Appendix A for more details). The first argument that seems to prevail in most 
studies is the inequality of the legal environment, or in some cases, the lack of law 
enforcement (Yamouri, 2010). This environment makes resolving administrative 
issues much cumbersome for women than men leading to less female in 
entrepreneurship positions. In Egypt for instance, when going through the legal 
system, a woman would need on average 86 weeks to solve a disagreement while a 
man would only need 54 for the same matter (Yamouri, 2010). Entrepreneurship is 
also harder for women because of the difficulties they face when raising capital 
(Mcloughlin, 2013). Lending policies are discriminatory in most Arab countries and 
therefore launching a business can be easier for men. Hence, we find fewer women 
leading enterprises than men in Arab countries. 
Even if the Arab region seems to be more open and ideologically changing, it 
has a hard time overcoming some cultural perceptions. In Arab countries, for instance, 
the approval of women working when the husband can support the household is not 
systematic. Wives need their partners’ consent to be able to work and even though 
more husbands accept to let them work, many are still reluctant. The cultural situation 
is evolving but needs time and effort (Yamouri, 2010). Cultural restrictions also 
include women’s role in household duties (The World Bank, 2012). In Arab states, 
women’s role in the domestic life is more traditional than in the rest of the world and 
the nature of the wife’s job should fit the housework tasks. This cultural view is not 
altered by whether the woman actually holds a degree or not. While in Western 
societies women’s professional lives are sacred and valued, Arab women are assessed 
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by the state of their houses before their career achievements. Henceforward, cultural 
norms restrict women from participating in the labor market. 
The percentage of women participating in the workforce is too low to be 
explained by legal and cultural discrepancies only. This rate does not seem to 
represent the increase in female education at all levels. Therefore, there should be a 
segment of females who does not join the job life even after obtaining a degree. This 
assumption would hold if one does not take into account the informal sector.  
Informal employment is particularly high in the Arab region. Informal occupations 
are not exclusive to uneducated people but even employees with university education 
(Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, 2012). A correlation analysis has shown that informality 
of work in Arab countries is highly correlated with being a woman (Angel-Urdinola 
& Tanabe, 2012). When comparing the percentage of women and the one of men 
working in the informal sector, the results are different from a country to another. 
More agricultural countries like Morocco have more female working in the informal 
sector. The same analysis has also shown the chances of working in the informal 
sector drop as the person’s educational level goes up (Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, 
2012). More females reaching higher education should thus decrease their presence in 
the informal market. 
As for other positions women prefer to hold, they are usually in the public 
sector. The reason for choosing the public sector over the private one is that it offers 
more flexible hours and is less demanding (Mcloughlin, 2013). Most married women 
in Arab countries would only work in the public sector and some females quit their 
positions in the private segment once engaged or pregnant. Jobs in private companies 
are considered incompatible with wives’ at-home duties. This decision to quit the job 
after getting married is related to another law: legal minimum age for marriage (The 
World Bank, 2012). This age is set to a particularly low level in the Arab region and 
delaying it would ensure married women to be more empowered in taking a decision 
to either pursue their studies or not to give up on their careers. Thus, most of the Arab 
women who work formally are concentrated in public administrations and this sector 
does not show signs of a significant growth (Mcloughlin, 2013).    
All these reasons that could explain why females have such a low labor 
participation rate despite the increase in their average years of education are amplified 
for young graduates (Mcloughlin, 2013). These women face both the obstacles of 
being a female and the ones of being new in the job market. Other barriers that 
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researchers have found out were the difficulty to access information either through 
lack of technological means or through a deficiency in informing young female 
graduates (Mcloughlin, 2013). One last reason behind female low participation rates 
is the poor transportation system in the Arab region and the little mobility women 
enjoy. Public transportations in these countries are unsafe and make it harder for 
women to move freely.  
Most of the evidence emphasized above relates to the importance of education of 
females in relation to their participation in labor markets and consequently in 
economic growth and development. But, further empirical evidence needs to be 
developed in order to illustrate the major benefits from education in general and that 
of females in particular. More research on these issues is taking place but is still 
limited in quantity and quality. Empirical models are also to be in place so as to 
measure the effects of education on the incorporation of females in the workforce.  
 
II. Empirical Investigations 
This part covers the data sources and the variables used in the analysis besides the 
descriptive statistics and the regressions conducted for both Arab and ECE countries.  
 
1) Data sources and variables 
The data used are those from UNESCO, Barro & Lee (2010), and from the 
World  Bank Data websites. The most important variables concerned include: 
• Out-of-school rates for children of primary school age: This represents 
the percentage of children in primary school age who are not enrolled 
in primary school (either a public or private institution) provided by 
the UNESCO. These rates are available for female and male students. 
• Out-of-school rates for children of lower secondary school age: These 
are the numbers provided for the UNESCO for children in age of lower 
secondary schooling who are not registered in any public nor private 
institution. Rates are provided for females, and males in Arab states in 
general and in a set of Arab countries. 
• Effective transition rate to lower secondary: These numbers represent 
the percentage of students who once graduated from primary school 
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decides to go for secondary education and is from the UNESCO 
database. 
• Survival rate to last grade of primary: Out of 100 students who started 
primary school, the number of students who graduate from it. These 
rates were from the UNESCO database. 
• Unemployment rates: They represent the percentage of labor market 
that is looking for an occupation. These rates are for both men and 
women and were retrieved from the World Bank databank.  
• Average years of schooling: This data was available on the Barro & 
Lee website for females and the total population. From these two sets 
of data, we computed the males’ average years of schooling. This data 
represents the mean of formal studying received by people of a certain 
age group. We used 15 and plus to match the labor participation rate 
criterion. 
• Labor participation rate: The percentage of people who are 15 years 
and older and is economically active. This data was available for male, 
female, and the total population data. This data was retrieved from the 
World Bank databank. 
  
 These datasets are used for both descriptive and regression analyzes needed to 
achieve the objectives of this paper.  
2) Descriptive Statistics 
 The descriptive statistics analysis is respectively applied to Arab economies 
and ECE countries.  
a) Arab countries 
 In the Arab countries, the general trend is a decrease of out-of-school children 
for both genders at all education levels. Out-of-school rates for primary education for 
females have been dropping from 15.3% to 13.8% in the past four years (UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, 2013). The situation for out of school rates for children of 
lower secondary school age is comparable to the primary school levels. As of 2011, 
there were 14.53% male out of school in comparison to 18.94% female in the Arab 
states (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2013). The same trend is prevalent in the fact 
that these numbers have been decreasing for the past years. However, while the 
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amount of decline of female out of school rate is nearly 4% over three years, the 
corresponding level for male is hardly 1%. This is in line with the findings of Dr. 
Nadine Sika who acknowledged the decrease of the gender gap in education in the 
Arab world (2011). Out-of-school rates for males and females are now closer than this 
was the case few years ago. 
 In tertiary institutions, the trend has been moving towards more schooling for 
women than men. Reverse gender gap has started to show up in some countries like 
Algeria where more women were enrolled in college than men. In 2011, the gross 
enrollment ratio in tertiary education for male was 22.9% while female rate was 
slightly higher with 23.43% (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2013). The situation 
was not the same in 1999 where the gross enrollment ratio for male was almost 4% 
higher than the one for female. Thus, the gender gap present twelve years earlier 
disappeared. Therefore, at all levels, women are more present in schools and statistics 
show a significant decrease in the gap between genders at school. 
 In a case-by-case analysis of Arab countries, the rates for Morocco, Algeria, 
and Palestine behave like the mean discussed above. Statistics for countries in the 
Gulf present some differences. In primary, and secondary school, countries like 
Lebanon, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia have equal to higher out of school rates for male 
than female (See Appendix C for more details). As for tertiary education, gender gap 
goes in the opposite direction since we see that gross enrollment rates for women are 
higher than men. An example is in Qatar where the enrollment rate is six times higher 
for females than males, reaching 30.7% versus 5.5% for females. One assumption 
behind these statistics may be that more men pursue their studies abroad than women. 
 When looking at data in relationship to the drop out rates, one can see that 
Arab states suffer from high dropout levels across primary, secondary, and higher 
education. In 2010, for most of the Arab countries, survival rate through last grade of 
primary school was somewhat higher for female than male. Survival rates for both 
genders have been increasing through time and reached similar level in the past years. 
On the other hand, in Yemen, the survival rate for female in primary school is only 
68.03% while the one for male is 82.38% (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2013). 
Gender disparity in dropout rates is therefore still a problem in primary schools in 
some Arab countries.  
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Table 1: Survival Rate to last year of primary for Arab States in 2010 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
2013) 
Country Survival Rate to last year of 
primary male 
Survival Rate to last year 
of primary female 
Bahrain 97.40162 98.18224 
Egypt 98.90675 98.80417 
Algeria 94.01055 95.13255 
Lebanon 87.53598 93.58065 
Morocco 89.79586 89.01994 
Syria 95.11822 96.2073 
UAE 84.54929 84.34224 
 
 Once students graduate from primary schools, the decision to go through 
secondary schooling does not come as naturally as governments would like it to be. In 
2010, in countries like Bahrain, the problem is nearly absent since 100% of male 
observed an effective transition to secondary schools for 99.92% for their female 
counterparties (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2013). In other parts of the Arab 
world, transition to upper classes is a real issue. Female transition rates are lower than 
male’s in Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen but higher in Lebanon, United Arab 
Emirates, and Qatar (See Appendix B for details). The trend in these rates has been 
increasing but few countries have attained the desired 100%. 
 Moving on to drop out rates in secondary, the decreasing trend seems 
consistent with primary education. From the graduation ratio rates, we can see that 
more and more students complete their education with a higher percentage for female 
than male. In Jordan for instance, while 75.31% males completed secondary school in 
2008, there were 82% females who did. In Qatar and Oman, completion rates are 
around 100% in secondary for both males and females (UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics, 2013). Hence, while for primary education one can see discrepancies with 
higher dropout rates for female, the situation changes for secondary education where 
higher dropout rates are observed for male. Furthermore, drop out rates in secondary 
schools are on average lower than the ones in primary. 
 Arab countries suffer from high dropout rates in tertiary education and the 
trend is similar to the secondary schooling one. In Dubai, dropout rates for tertiary 
education reach 22% for male and 14% for female aged between 20 and 24 (Dubai 
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Statistics Center’s 2008 Labor Force Survey). In 2011 in Egypt, out of a 100 students 
that registered in higher education institutions, only 30% females graduated. The rate 
male’s graduation ratio is even lower with 29.2%  (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
2013). Gross graduation rates at the higher education have the same increasing 
tendency for both males and females in all the Arab countries. As of 2011, even 
though graduation rates were relatively low in most Arab countries, they were similar 
for both genders.  
 The trend in unemployment rates for males and females has also been 
decreasing in the past seven years. However, rates for women are much higher than 
the equivalent ones for men. For instance, in Egypt, gross unemployment rates for 
females have gone from 24.2% in 2003 to 22.3% in 2010 (World Bank Data, 2013). 
These numbers were even lower in 2007 with 18.7% with the government initiative to 
hire more women at the time. Unemployment rates for males on the other hand reach 
considerably lower levels. They have dropped from 6.5% in 2003 to 4.9% in 2010 
(World Bank Data, 2013). This confirms that even though females are participating in 
the workforce, unemployment rate is still higher for them than for males.  
 The labor participation rates for female have a changing tendency similar to 
the unemployment rates. They have been increasing for the past twenty years in all 
Arab countries. In Yemen, Jordan, and Algeria, these rates have gone up by more than 
50%. In Qatar, the trend was not upward during the two decades but has seen a 
decline in the first half. On the other hand, labor participation rates for males have not 
particularly increased in the past twenty years. They have seen some slight variations 
through the years but not for more than 1% in all this time (World Bank Data, 2013). 
The rates are nonetheless much lower for females than males. In 2011, the rate of 
labor participation for female was barely 15% while the one for male was more than 
four times higher with a 71%. Female participation rates need yet to grow in order to 
attain similar levels as male. It comes with no surprise that the labor participation 
rates for the total population are going up as a result of the female higher 
participation. 
 Starting from 1950, the average year of schooling for female has been going 
up. The trend has become more pronounced starting 1970 (Barro & Lee Database, 
2013). On average, it increases by one unit every five years. The increase in the 
average years of schooling for male is not as great. In fact, by 2010, there was almost 
no difference between that of females and the one of males. In Saudi Arabia, it was of 
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8.18 for female and 8.76 for male. The gender gap in this indicator has not 
disappeared in all Arab countries, but its magnitude has significantly decreased in the 
past years.  
b) Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEE) 
Out of school rates for primary level in CEE countries seemed to be constant 
in the past four years for both males and females. In 2008, the percentage of males out 
of school was 3.83%. In 2011, it was of 3.75% (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
2013). The same trend is present in CEE countries for secondary level with rates 
around 6% since 2008 for both males and females (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
2013). Enrollment rates in tertiary education are higher for female than male. In 2011, 
there were 75.79% female enrolled and 60.97% male in CEE higher education 
institutions (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2013). The corresponding rates in 2008 
show a slow increasing trend through years with a higher slope for males than 
females. In comparison with Arab countries, out of school rates in CEE countries are 
much lower and enrollment rates in tertiary education are almost double what they are 
in the Arab region. 
Dropout rates have been going down for primary school for both genders. In 
Albania, survival rates in primary school went up simultaneously for males and 
females. Female rates increased from 93.2 % in 2008 to 97.3% (UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics, 2013). In most CEE countries like Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
and Lithuania there is no gender gap in survival rates and they reach the high nineties 
for both boys and girls. This trend is found again for survival rates in upper classes. 
Survival rates in secondary school and higher education are also high and similar for 
women and men varying between 91% in Republic of Moldova and 98% in Serbia 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2013). Survival rates at all educational levels are 
higher in CEE countries than in the Arab world. CEE countries have already achieved 
gender equality in school attendance while Arab states are still struggling to make this 
happen. 
There is no specific trend of unemployment rates for all CEE countries. While 
they have seen their numbers dropping until 2008, most of the countries have faced 
higher unemployment rates after that year. This phenomenon could be explained by 
the European leverage crisis they have faced in 2009. Nevertheless, gender disparity 
in unemployment rate is almost absent. As of 2011, there was no significant 
difference between unemployment rates for females and males. In Hungary for 
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instance, both unemployment rates for female and male were of 11% (UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, 2013). This is a new distinction from Arab countries where the 
difference between male and female unemployment rates is more substantial. 
 Labor participation rates for females have been slightly decreasing since 
1990. For some countries, it stayed constant but in others like Belarus, the rate has 
dropped by up to 10%. Male labor participation rates have not changed much in CEE 
countries since 1990. Belarus has also experienced a drop of 13% in male 
participation in the past twenty years but no other major drop was felt in any other 
country (The World Bank, 2013). In comparison, male participation rates are larger 
than female’s. Just like for Arab countries, there is a gender gap in labor participation 
between men and women.  
The average years of schooling for both males and females in CEE countries 
has seen an increase through time. In 1950, the gender gap in most CEE countries was 
of more or less a year. But as time passed by, this discrepancy was shrinking. By 
2010, this gap was absent (Barro & Lee, 2013). This implies that the increase in the 
average years of schooling for female has grown faster than the one for male. In 
Ukraine, for instance, the average years of schooling for male went from 5.05% in 
1950 to 11.18% in 2010 and from 3.95% to 11.03% for female. In contrast with Arab 
countries, this average is higher for both males and females.  
3) Regression analysis 
Using the female average years of schooling data from the Barro and Lee 
database and the labor participation rates from the World Bank database, the effect of 
the increase in women’s education and their injection in the job market were 
investigated. One way to do so was to regress labor participation rate on the average 
years of schooling for women, men, and the total population and to compare the 
results accordingly. Since the Barro and Lee estimate is computed every 5 years, the 
idea was to go as back in time as possible to get a maximum number of data points. 
Data from the World Bank was only available starting 1990 so that was the first year 
used. Next, estimates for every five years up to 2010 were used.  
a) Arab countries 
The first country proceeded with was Algeria. In Algeria, running regression 
with female labor participation as the dependent variable and average years of 
schooling as the independent one gives a slope of 1.3 compared to 0.2 when done for 
the total population. Both these coefficient were statistically significant at the 5% 
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level. Hence, when female average years of schooling increase with 1 year, there is 
more than 1% females injected in the job market. On the other hand, if the average 
year of schooling for the whole population goes up by a year, it will only drive the 
labor participation by 0.2%. This could be interpreted as an evidence of the 
feminization of the workforce through education. Gaining in women’s education leads 
to a gain in the percentage of women participating in the labor market. The same 
regression on male only confirms this hypothesis since the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The second country studied was Morocco. In Morocco, the average year of 
schooling does not seem to be statistically significant for female labor participation at 
the 5% level. Moreover, the coefficient is negative (-0.2). When running the same 
regression for the total population, the coefficient is not significant either. In 
magnitude, it is even larger than the one for females. In fact, the more years on 
average people study, the less they go for the labor market. The regression on male 
does lead to a significant coefficient under 5 % probability. Unsurprisingly, this 
coefficient is negative (-2.51) and implies less labor market participation as the 
average schooling years goes up. A large informal market going on in the region 
could explain this. Morocco is one of the countries with the highest informal labor 
market (Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, 2012). Thus, the official labor participation rates 
do not represent the entire working class. Another reason could be that this average 
only increases by the same population who was accessing school in the first place. In 
other words, there are not more educated people but the percentage of people who 
used to go to school has increased its number of years in the education system. 
In order to obtain a more diversified result, the test was performed on two 
Middle Eastern countries: Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In these two countries, just like in 
Algeria, the average years of schooling seems to be significant in explaining the 
increase in labor participation of female. Its coefficient is of 0.7 in Saudi Arabia and 
of 1.49 in Jordan, which correspond to an increase in the labor market through 
education. On the other hand, the coefficients for the total population in the two 
countries do not appear to be statistically significant at the 5% level. This second 
finding could be explained by less percentage of males participating in the labor force 
through education. Once running the same test for males, it appears that the 
coefficients are both negative and not statistically significant at 5 % level. One reason 
could be that the percentage of males in the labor market was already high enough in 
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1990 (around 75% in Saudi Arabia and 68% in Jordan) and had little chance of seeing 
any growth in the future. Therefore, in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, females are injected 
to the job market through education but we cannot advance the same conclusion for 
males.  
The next country to analyze was the United Arab Emirates. The results from 
these regressions were similar to the ones in Algeria where the coefficient was 
significant for both female and total population but rejected for male regressions at 
the 5% level. The coefficient for female average years of schooling was of 4.5, which 
is one of the largest among the countries studied. The labor participation for male was 
also one of the highest with an average of 92%. The significance of average years of 
schooling for the total population participation in labor was driven by the female 
injection to the job market through the education process (See Appendix D for more 
details on the regressions coefficients and statistics). 
The last country to look at was Qatar. The reason behind this choice is that 
unlike other Arab countries, Qatar did not have the same increasing tendency in 
female labor participation rates through the entire time period chosen (See Appendix 
E for more details). Qatar’s rates have been decreasing during the first decade before 
spiking up during the second one. Overall, the participation rates were the highest in 
the Arab region. In magnitude, they are as high as CEE countries’. Once running the 
regressions, the results were different from the rest of the group. The female 
coefficient was pretty high even though it is rejected at the 5% level. It is of 3.33 
implying that when the average years of schooling increases by a year, the labor 
participation rate increases by 3.33%. For males, the coefficient was 10 times lower 
and insignificant as well. The total population regression does not lead to a significant 
result either.  
From the results of these tests, we can conclude that it would be hard to draw a 
single conclusion on all Arab countries. Other than in Morocco, the regression results 
refute the findings of the report on the MENA paradox that claims that investment in 
education has not yet started showing in the job market (The World Bank, 2012). 
Another set of interesting regressions to perform would be using the log of the data to 
obtain the elasticity and to use the square of the independent variable to investigate 
the presence of any U-shaped relationship. 
• Log Regressions 
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Country Gender Coefficient t-statistics 
 
Algeria 
Male -0.117 -1.16 
Female 0.549 9.99 
Total 0.036 0.62 
 
Morocco 
Male -0.15 -3.27 
Female -0.009 -0.09 
Total -0.112 -1.94 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Male -0.031 -3.25 
Female 0.302 3.02 
Total -0.202 -1.89 
 
Jordan 
Male 0.013 0.093 
Female 0.91 3.58 
Total 0.11 0.99 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Male 0.025 2.30 
Female 1.11 7.10 
Total 0.18 6.24 
 
Qatar 
Male 0.018 0.26 
Female 0.48 1.20 
Total 0.16 0.82 
 
The numbers in this table represent the percentage change in labor market 
relative to a percentage change in average years of schooling. The highest elasticity 
for female regressions is the UAE’s followed by Jordan. This means that an increase 
of 1% in the average years of schooling could lead to an increase of more than 1% of 
female participation in the job market. The UAE have invested tremendous amounts 
of money and efforts in improving the education system and it translated into higher 
average years at schools, leading to an increase in women’s labor participation. Male 
regressions were mostly insignificant and do not tell much about the effect of an 
increase in the average years of schooling on the labor participation. 
 
• Square regression 
The intuition behind the square regression is the U-shape relationship between 
education and labor participation. The theory behind such a trend is that women with 
no to low education highly participate in the workforce through low wages positions 
such as agricultural work. This class of women usually works by necessity. On the 
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other hand, highly educated women have fewer barriers to participating in the labor 
market. They also have better salaries that make the job market attractive for them. In 
between, women with average education face all the struggles discussed in previous 
sections of the paper. Therefore, the shape of labor participation versus education 
level should look like a smile rather than a straight line (Klasen and Pieters, 2012).  
When plotting graphs of labor participation in terms of average year of 
schooling for several Arab countries, a slight U-shape is noticeable for females. It is 
sometimes only present in a time interval. An example is the case of the United Arab 
Emirates: 
     
The following table contains the results of the squared regression on the 
selected countries: 
Country Gender Coefficient T statistics 
 
Algeria 
Male -0.10 -1.41 
Female 0.12 11.83 
Total 0.013 0.37 
 
Morocco 
Male -0.26 -4.74 
Female -0.066 -0.44 
Total -0.21 -2.72 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Male -0.199 -2.71 
Female 0.06 4.55 
Total -0.097 -1.64 
 
Jordan 
Male -0.0003 -0.036 
Female 2.49 3.29 
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Total 0.0024 0.79 
UAE Male 0.0207 1.99 
Female 18.45 6.75 
Total 0.019 7.80 
 
Qatar 
Male 0.027 0.33 
Female 0.238 1.48 
Total 0.18 0.99 
 
Running regressions using the square of the independent variables only shows 
quadratic relationship in cases where a linear one was previously proved. Therefore a 
U-shaped type of association between labor market and education is present in some 
cases. A more accurate observation is that this relationship is mainly associated with 
females. In Morocco, the U-shaped trend was prevalent for males since the coefficient 
is both significant and negative. Just like for the simple linear regressions, the largest 
coefficients are associated with the UAE followed by Jordan. 
b) CEE countries 
A simple linear regression was ran of five CEE countries: 
Country Gender Coefficient T statistics 
 
Ukraine 
Male -4.80 -2.92 
Female -1.79 -2.15 
Total -0.04 -3.47 
 
Lithuania 
Male -0.058 -3.41 
Female -2.5 -2.30 
Total -2.83 -2.50 
 
Czech Republic 
Male -1.03 -1.96 
Female -0.86 -1.20 
Total -0.78 -1.23 
 
Hungary 
Male -2.73 -4.66 
Female -1.46 -1.11 
Total 0.0024 -1.52 
 
Albania 
Male -1.04 -2.13 
Female -1.99 -10.55 
Total -1.32 -4.47 
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From this table of regressions, one can see that almost all the coefficients were 
negative. Therefore an increase in the average years of schooling actually leads to a 
decrease in labor market participation. However, this decrease in labor participation 
might just be the result of the European crisis in the past years. Because of the hard 
economic environment, less people were tempted by the formal labor market and thus 
explain the decrease in participation despite the changes in average years of 
schooling. Furthermore, most of these coefficients were not statistically significant at 
the 5% level and cannot be treated as explanatory. In other words, in CEE countries, 
the explanatory power of average years of schooling over participation may be too 
low to be taken into account. 
In comparison with the Arab world, the participation rates in CEE countries 
were significantly higher. Therefore, these countries have possibly already reached a 
stage (that Arab countries have not reached yet) where we can see a backward 
phenomenon. The labor market in CEE countries may be at a point where an increase 
in participation of either gender is not needed. This could be argued by examining the 
relationship between labor participation and economic development. Once the labor 
market is saturated, even if education levels are rising, the participation would 
decrease. Next, Maybe CEE countries have lived the injection of females through 
education in an earlier era. There is no data available to test this hypothesis but it is a 
reasonable assumption to make. Finally, population ageing might be another reason 
for the decrease of labor participation. Perhaps the decrease of labor participation is 
simply due to retirement of workers. The descriptive analysis of the current data 
corroborates the previous statements. While participation rates in Arab countries over 
the period studied were increasing, the ones CEE countries were constant to 
decreasing in some countries. Hence, the two regions were not in the same situation in 
the past twenty years.  
A last comparison to make is in the shape of the graph of female labor 
participation versus average years of schooling. In fact, while the one for Arab 
countries (here the UAE are used as an example) could be interpreted as linear, the 
one for CEE countries is far from being so (using Lithuania as an example). This non-
linearity could also be the reason for the insignificance of the coefficients in the 
regressions presented previously. This result is also present in the case of Qatar where 
the non linearity of the graph led to insignificant coefficients.  
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In this example, while the graph for the UAE seems to follow a consistent 
increasing trend, the one for Lithuania goes up and down. The UAE are also the 
country with the second highest rate of female labor participation in the Arab world 
(after Qatar) is still behind Lithuania which does not hold the same position among 
CEE countries. 
These empirical results show some distinctions between male and female in Arab 
economies but also discrepancies between Arab and CEE countries. There could be 
several reasons behind these differences. Moreover, there are numerous implications 
to be drawn and are discussed below. 
III. Discussion 
Giving the current economic situation of the Arab world, the feminization of the 
job market is progressing and is not a choice. In order to develop their economies, 
Arab countries need to enhance the contribution of their human resources with the 
involvement of more women. But as labor markets require skilled human resources, 
both public and private sectors in Arab economies increasingly need educated 
women. This is why education is gradually becoming the most important mean for the 
promotion of more females in accessing labor markets. In the present research, the 
average schooling years of Barro and Lee (2010) is used as a proxy for the 
educational level. The effect of its change on labor participation shows how 
feminization is induced by education. While education positively contributes to 
increasing labor participation for females in the Arab countries, it did not seem to be 
significant in the case of Central and Eastern European economies (CEE). This could 
be explained by the fact that the feminization process of Arab countries is more recent 
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than that of CEE. Indeed, CEE countries do not suffer from gender gap in education 
anymore. They have also reached similar levels of labor participation for males and 
females. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that they have already lived feminization of 
their job market at an earlier age.  
However, the feminization process of Arab countries does not seem to be fast 
enough since gender gap is still present between participation rates for males and 
females. Even with lower dropout rates and higher at-school rates for women, labor 
participation rates are considerably different between men and women. 
Unemployment rates are also larger for females than males. Consequently, reforms 
should be implemented to solve for these discrepancies between the two genders in 
education and employment. These reforms should be in legal and social areas. Society 
and government, for a better integration of female in the job market, should make 
efforts. Such initiatives have started emerging in some countries. A quota for females 
in the parliament has been established in Iraq and Jordan for instance (The World 
Bank, 2012). This would ensure a minimum female participation in the political 
sphere. If the Arab region continues on the right path, Arab women should, one day, 
be as numerous in the workplace as their male pairs.   
Finally, the rates at which this feminization process is being achieved are quite 
different from a country to another. Whether this difference is due to the quality of 
local education or the geographical position needs further investigation. Thus, other 
Arab countries could beneficiate from the UAE’s success in inserting a high 
percentage of women in the job market through education and try a similar strategy in 
forming and hiring females. The difference between Arab countries feminization rate 
could also be due to the economic development of each country.  
 
Conclusion 
While looking at rising participation rates for Arab women in the job market, 
the question is whether females enter the workforce through receiving an appropriate 
education to better assess the role of education n the feminization of labor markets, or 
through some other process. First, the trends in female schooling and dropout rates 
were to be observed to better see the yield of each educational stage. Second, moving 
on from an educational level to another, the eventual gender gaps in both educational 
yields and losses are analyzed to better perceive the gaps in different economies and 
areas. Lastly, the focus was on the changes in the participation of women to the job 
  
 25
markets in comparison to men and to the total population. In order to provide a 
comparison on this phenomenon, statistical tests are performed on similar matters 
pertaining to Central and Eastern Europe.  
The trends in out-of-school rates in the past years have been decreasing for 
both males and females in the Arab world. More children are now attending schools 
and the gender gap has even disappeared in some countries. These higher rates have 
translated into higher average years of schooling for both Arab males and females. 
Similarly, dropout rates have been sinking simultaneously. However, dropouts are 
still more important in primary and tertiary education than in secondary for Gulf 
countries but remain higher also in secondary education for the North-African 
economies. Female labor participation has been going up when male participation did 
not seem to change notably in the past twenty years. Nonetheless, while 
unemployment rates have seen an improvement in the past decades, females still 
suffer from higher rates than males. In contrast, in CEE countries, no gender gap was 
detected at any level of education or employment. The trend in the past years was also 
different than the one in Arab countries. No increase in labor participation or 
education was detected. Rates were high enough to remain constant through time.  
 Statistically, feminization of the job market through education is highly 
significant in Arab countries. The average years of schooling index was used in a 
regression to explain the changes in participation rates. It turned out to have a positive 
coefficient and be significant in most of the countries tested for: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, and the UAE. The only exceptions were for Morocco and Qatar. Some 
authors relate that to the existence of more accentuated informalities in the labor 
markets. Angel Urdinola and Tanabe (2012) show that Morocco suffers from a large 
informal sector, which makes its participation rates less accurate. On the other hand, 
changes in labor participation rates in Qatar were not parallel to the changes in 
participation in the rest of the Arab world and are not representative of the Arab 
economies. Hence, it is reasonable to overlook the tests for Morocco and Qatar. From 
the results of the other countries’ regressions, it can be concluded that the insertion of 
women in the labor market happens through an increase in their schooling years. 
Comparing these results to males’ showed that male coefficients were negative and 
non significant. One interpretation could be that the average years of schooling was 
not sufficient in explaining the changes in males’ labor participation rates.   
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 The second part of the study was about comparing these results to the ones 
obtained from running the same tests on CEE countries. Regressions in CEE countries 
showed little to no significance of average years of schooling on labor participation. 
The coefficients of the five countries studied were negative. Several reasons could be 
behind the lack of explanatory power of these regressions. Mainly the fact that 
markets are saturated since labor participation rates is already high enough. Ageing of 
the working class and economic crisis could also be playing their role in these results. 
The comparison between Arab and the CEE countries mainly shows that these two 
regions are at different stages of the feminization process. While in some Arab 
countries labor participation rates for females are barely 15% (like Algeria), labor 
participation rates in the ECE countries are around 50% or more.  
 Arab countries have realized the importance of involving women in the labor 
market. They seem to have started their insertion through education and positive 
results have already translated into increasing rates. This new politics of reducing 
gender disparities should stay in place and be reinforced in order to reach the same 
results CEE countries have reached. Females’ future is undoubtedly to be part of the 
Arab workforce.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Data from the World Bank 
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Appendix B 
Table 2: Effective Transition Rates to Lower Secondary by Gender (UNESCO, Institute for Statistics, 2013) 
COUNTRY Effective transition rate to 
lower secondary (%) 
Male 2010 
Effective transition rate to lower 
secondary (%) Female 
2010 
Algeria 100 97.06229 
Bahrain 100 99.92072 
Lebanon 93.58945 96.70027 
Morocco 91.94356 84.51799 
Palestine 94.73775 100 
Qatar 99.9499 100 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
98.72956 98.27506 
United Arab 
Emirates 
91.77475 100 
Yemen 93.28828 87.77918 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
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Appendix D 
 
Country Gender Coefficient T stats 
 
Algeria 
Male -1.33 -1.28 
Female 0.549 10.57 
Total 0.036 0.48 
 
Morocco 
Male -0.2 -3.93 
Female -0.25 -0.26 
Total -1.60 -2.22 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Male -3.16 -2.96 
Female 0.79 2.54 
Total -1.44 -1.79 
 
Jordan 
Male 0.029 0.026 
Female 1.49 3.38 
Total 0.52 0.87 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Male 0.31 2.14 
Female 4.50 5.92 
Total 1.92 6.83 
 
Qatar 
Male  0.31 0.30 
Female 3.33 1.37 
Total 2.23 0.92 
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